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EVIDENCE
Sixth Amendment . Right of Confrontation
Limitations on the Bruton Rule
Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
N SOME joint criminal trials the right of one defendant to refrain from self
incrimination may come into conflict with the right of another defendant
to confront the witnesses against him. The problem arises when one de-
fendant refuses to testify at trial after having made a voluntary, out of court
statement which tends to implicate a second defendant. The rules of evidence
allow the statement to be introduced at trial only against the party making
it; its use against the implicated defendant is excluded as hearsay.' The
rules also provide for the court to instruct the jury on the limited admissi-
bility of the statement.!
But will the jury be able to disregard the statement in weighing the
evidence pertaining to the second defendant, yet give the statement ap-
propriate force as to the maker? Has the admission into evidence of the
out of court statement, even in its limited application, effectively circum-
vented the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, estab-
lished and secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to
the Constitution?'
In Bruton v. United States" the Supreme Court decided that instruc-
tions to the jury to limit application of evidence were inadequate protection
for this fundamental right of confrontation. However, in Parker v. Randolph
5
the Court seems to place limitations on the Bruton rule6 that jury in-
structions are not adequate to protect one's sixth amendment rights, at
least in those cases where both defendants have confessed and the con-
fessions are mutually consistent and supportive.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Bruton' was strong support for
a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him at trial. There, the
Court held that the admission into evidence of a non-testifying defendant's
confession which implicated a codefendant deprived the latter of his sixth
amendment rights, even though the jury was instructed to disregard the
1 FED. R. Evm. 801.
2 FED. R. EviD. 105.
s U.S. CONST. amend. VI, states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. .. .
'Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
5 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
6A thorough discussion of the Bruton case can be found in the following: Comment, 26
U. MIAMI L. REV. 755 (1972); Note, 76 DiCK. L. REv. 354 (1972); Note, 8 WAsHBURN
UJ. 381 (1969).
7391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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confession as hearsay evidence in their consideration of the guilt or inno-
cence of the codefendant.' The conclusion of the Court was that "we cannot
accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's con-
stitutional right of cross-examination."9
With its decision in Parker v. Randolph,"0 the Court has made a
pragmatic interpretation of the Bruton rule in an effort to clarify its ap-
plication by state and federal courts. In Randolph the Court backed away
from a rigid construction of the right to confront witnesses and, under the
circumstances of the case, found no error in allowing a non-testifying co-
defendant's confession into evidence against the maker where it had been
redacted" and the jury instructed to disregard it as to any other defendant.
The Court distinguished Randolph from Bruton by noting that the de-
fendants claiming Bruton error in their convictions had themselves made
voluntary confessions which were properly admissible against them, and
therefore the possible impact on the jury of a codefendant's confession was
believed not so devastating or vital as to require reversal.' The bottom
line seems to be that a defendant's free and voluntary interlocking con-
fession" is so overwhelmingly inculpatory as to make the possibility that
a jury will not disregard hearsay evidence upon the instruction of the
court of little concern, i.e., harmless.
The circumstances in Randolph are reminiscent of the more colorful
days of the old west when a card cheat was fair game for anyone." The main
characters, Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton, were enlisted to conduct a
robbery of a poker game by one of the players, Robert Wood. Wood, not
exactly a neophyte at cards, was convinced that the other player, a pro-
fessional gambler from Las Vegas named Douglas, had cheated him in
the course of several earlier games. Wood decided to stage a robbery to
recoup his losses and, seeking assistance, recruited Hamilton who worked
for his brother, Joe Wood. Hamilton, in turn, obtained the services of
Randolph and Pickens just prior to the robbery. The last game was con-
s 391 U.S. at 126.
9 Id. at 123.
10 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
11 Redaction is an editing process to reduce the impact of a statement on other de-
fendants against whom the statement is inadmissible. Names, references to personal
characteristics and other identifying phraseology in the statement are either erased or
replaced with non-specific language. Whether a redacted statement is effective or not
is, of course, known only by the jury.
12 99 S. Ct. at 2140.8 Interlocking confessions are those in which the facts are consistent, one with the other,
and provide similar inferences.
"The facts of the case were gleaned from a number of sources, including the Supreme
Court opinion; Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1978); Petition and Briefs,Parker v. Randolph (Law Reprints, Criminal Law Series, Vol. 10, No. 23, 1978/1979
term).
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ducted on schedule between the two principals with Joe Wood and one
Tommy Thomas as spectators.
With the game in progress, Joe Wood, on the pretext of bringing
some beer, left to pick up the three accomplices. Douglas was apparently
suspicious and, upon Joe's return, brought a shotgun to the table. The
presence of the gun precipitated action by Joe Wood. He pulled his gun
on Douglas from behind and ordered him to the floor. Giving Robert the
gun, Joe then went to get the three recruits to complete the robbery as
planned.
Moments before the four returned to the scene of the game, Robert
Wood shot and killed Douglas as he attempted to reach a pistol in his belt.
Together then for the first time, the five men gathered up the money and
fled into the night, leaving the spectator, Thomas, at the scene with the body
of Douglas. When apprehended by the police, all defendants but Joe Wood
voluntarily made statements expressing their involvement in the crime.
The five were jointly tried in the Criminal Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee for the crime of murder during the commission of a robbery."
5
Only Robert Wood took the witness stand at trial, where he pleaded self-
defense. The extrajudicial statements of the other four-Robert Wood,
Hamilton, Pickens and Randolph-were subjected to a program of redac-
tion 6 and admitted through testimony of police officers. The court in-
structed the jury to consider each confession only against the maker. On
July 25, 1972 all were found guilty and sentenced to life in the state
penitentiary.
Appeals were taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
where in June 1974 the convictions of all five defendants were reversed.
7
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the state a writ of certiorari and in
December 1975 rendered a per curiam opinion reversing the Court of
Criminal Appeals and affirming all five convictions.
Pickens and Randolph, later joined with Hamilton, obtained a writ
of habeas corpus and their case was heard by the federal district court in
Memphis. In a memorandum decision, the district judge found that the
rights of each of the three petitioners, as defined by the rule of Bruton,
had been violated and that the effect could not be adjudged harmless
error.' The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
1 5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402. (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1979). This is the Tennessee
version of a felony murder statute.
16 99 S. Ct. at 2136 n.3.
17 It is possible that concern over the Tennessee felony murder statute was a factor in the
reversal. See Petition and Briefs, supra note 14.
28 99 S. Ct. at 2136.
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court's decision on May 19, 1978.19 The State of Tennessee then obtained
a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.2"
The Court's stated purpose in granting certiorari was to resolve the
differences existing between the circuit courts in the application of the
Bruton rule.2 In the decade subsequent to the decision in Bruton some cir-
cuits had developed an exception to the rule, admitting a confession which
inculpated another defendant who had also confessed.22 Other circuits
continued to adhere to a strict interpretation of Bruton. The basis of such
holdings was the belief that the sixth amendment rights were per se denied
by the admission of hearsay evidence even if clearly and vigorously limited
in application."2
The problem the Court attempted to solve was to identify the point
of equilibrium among the three relevant factors of, one, the defendant's
right to confront adverse witnesses; two, the jury's ability to follow judicial
instruction regarding hearsay testimony; and, three, the economy and
efficiency of joint trials. By its decision in Randolph, the Court has adjusted
the point of equilibrium further away from the sixth amendment right of
confrontation than it had after Bruton.
A historical review of the Court's treatment of the above relationships
is necessary if the effects of Randolph are to be fairly assessed.
Confidence in the ability of the jury to follow judicial instructions
was a major factor in the Court's holding in Delli Paoli v. United States"
in 1957. In that case, where the confession of a codefendant was admitted
solely against the maker, without redaction but accompanied by a series
of clear admonishments by the trial judge limiting the application, the
Court did not find reversible error. Relying on, "a basic premise of ourjury system that the court states the law to the jury and the jury applies that
law to the facts as the jury finds them,""5 the admission of the confession was
considered merely cumulative to the other uncontradicted testimony in-
dicting the defendant. Thus, where the case against the defendant was in-
dependently sound, exclusionary instructions were considered sufficient to
protect the defendant's rights against hearsay evidence."
19 Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1978).
20 439 U.S. 978 (1978).
21 99 S. Ct. at 2137.
22 Id. n.4.
23 Id.
24 Dellt Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
25 Id. at 242.
26 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The hearsay evidence rule is
well understood to "prohibit the use of a person's assertion as equivalent to testimony tothe fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where
he may be probed and cross-examined ......
[Vol. 13:1
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The Court further recognized that the circumstances of the case would
determine whether a separate trial would be required to eliminate any undue
influence on the jury from the admission into evidence of the codefendant's
confession. The discretion of the trial judge was considered a satisfactory
safeguard.
The dissent by Justice Frankfurter in Delli Paoli (joined by Justices
Black, Douglas and Brennan) opposed leaving such a potentially crucial
decision to the trial judge 7 and offered that the government "should not
have a windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a
defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which
they cannot put out of their minds."28
Deli Paoli was expressly overruled by the decision in Bruton in 1968
and Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Delli Paoli, delivered the opinion of
the Bruton court." The circumstances in Bruton were such that the con-
fession of the nontestifying codefendant, one Evans, which was admitted
against him at trial, was, on appeal, declared inadmissible based on Westover
v. United States30 and Miranda v. Arizona." Evans was acquitted upon re-
trial. However, the appeals court, relying on Delli Paoli and placing con-
fidence in the jury's ability to disregard the confession, affirmed codefendant
Bruton's conviction, and ruled that the admission into evidence of the
confession was harmless in the face of "uncontradicted testimony [which]
provided the jury with convincing proof of Bruton's participation in the
crime."32 The court further noted that Bruton never moved for severance and
a separate trial as then provided for by Rule 14 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
evaluate Delli Paoli, responding to arguments that allowing the conviction
of Bruton to stand, "may be to place too great a strain upon the Delli Paoli
rule. ... "I'
The reversal of Delli Paoli by Bruton was a reflection of the Court's
reluctance to trust the sixth amendment rights of a defendant to the jury,
even where the defendant might have avoided the potential prejudice by
requesting a separate trial. While noting that the benefits of joint trials -
conservation of funds, convenience of witnesses and more timely trials -
were valid, the Court agreed with the assessment of Judge Lehman of the
27 352 U.S. at 247.
28 Id. at 248.
29391 U.S. 123 (1968).
3oWestover v. United States, 384 U.S. 494 (1966).
31 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'2Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967).
33 FED. R. ClUM. P. 14. A motion for severance would have caused an in camera review of
Evans' confession.
$1 391 U.S. at 126.
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New York Court of Appeals in concluding that the "price is to high.""5
In some instances, the argument continues, the risk that juries cannot erase
from their minds the confession of a codefendant when evaluating evidence
is so great and the consequences so serious that the hazard cannot be cor-
rected by instruction."s
The issue of joint or separate trials in those instances where a con-
fession could prejudice another defendant has been reviewed in connection
with the Bruton and Delli Paoli decisions." By using the flexibility provided
by Criminal Rule 14, as amended, the trial judge can evaluate in camera
confessions that are to be offered into evidence, and determine, if any, the
possible prejudicial effects. The court would then be able to eliminate any
potential Bruton error by severing the defendants for trial, albeit at the
previously mentioned costs attendant to separate trials. The options that
would be available to the government are to either accept the difficulties
of separate trials and proceed on that basis, or to withdraw the confession
from evidence against any defendant and rely on other fully admissible
evidence. This "sever or exclude" rule,38 as described in a dissent to Delli
Paoli, adds to an already heavy responsibility on the trial judge. But, the
requirement for another crucial decision should not be catastrophic, and
who is in a better position to evaluate the subtle influences that exist in
joint trials?
The question remaining after the Bruton decision was whether the
admission into evidence of a non-testifying codefendant's confession was
always to be considered reversible error, or whether the circumstances of
the individual case and the trial judge's assessment of them were to be
paramount. Could there be harmless Bruton error?
The Court had already ruled that a federal constitutional error could
be held "harmless" if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."9 In
Harrington v. California4 the Court had another opportunity to define the
extent to which it would allow the confrontation clause to operate in joint
trials. Over the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, the majority view
delivered by Justice Douglas, was that, in the face of overwhelming, direct
evidence which was distinct from the inadmissible, incriminating con-
fessions of codefendants, the violation of the Bruton rule was harmless.
The conclusion was that, "unless we say that no violation of Bruton can
constitute harmless error, we must leave this state conviction undisturbed."'"
35 People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928).
36 391 U.S. at 137.
37 E.g., 35 Mo. L. REv. 125 (1970).
3 Delli Paoli v. United States, 229 F.2d 319, 324 (2nd Cir. 1956).
39 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
40 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
41 Id. at 254.
[Vol. 13:1
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/10
Justice Brennan's dissent in Harrington focuses on the great responsi-
bility the majority decision places on the trial judge who must evaluate
whether the constitutional rights of the defendant have been violated and
whether such violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'2 Brennan
clearly and consistently supports the concept of an inviolate right to confront
a witness without the imposition of any permissible standard of error.
Expanding upon the thrust of the decision in Harrington, i.e., the harm-
less error of the codefendant's confession in the face of other strong inde-
pendent evidence of guilt, many circuit courts rejected the application of
the Bruton rule to cases where there were "interlocking" confessions by de-
fendants. "3 Apparently, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuit
courts considered the sixth amendment aspects to be overcome by the
corrobating statements made by the incriminated defendant." The Third
and Sixth Circuits took the other tack and have applied the Bruton rule and
found error in cases of interlocking confessions.'" This divergence of opinion
in the circuit courts is understandable when one discovers that both "sides"
claim support for their positions from Supreme Court decisions in the same
cases. 6 While these supporting cases all involved extrajudicial statements
of defendants, the circumstances and the timing vis a vis Bruton were such
that the Court was able to avoid a direct examination of the Bruton rule, or
was able to distinguish the case from one involving interlocking confessions.
It was, as stated earlier, this divergence of application that led the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Randolph. The majority"' is very care-
ful in its evaluation of the Bruton decision and specifically sets out to
broaden the issue from that posed in the petition for certiorari. Not content
to merely address the issue of a possible infringement of a defendant's
sixth amendment rights, the Court goes to the crux of the problem-can
the jury be relied on to follow judicial instruction? The majority believes
it is the general rule and not the exception, that juries are to be trusted to
- Id. at 256.
"3See note 13, supra.
44 See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968); Mack
v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Walton, 538 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1976); Metropolis v. Turner, 437
F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1971).
45See, e.g., United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976); Hodges v. Rose, 570
F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit impliedly adopted this position in Ignacio
v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969).
46 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 25 (1969); Hopper v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 658 (1968); Robert v. Russell, 322 U.S. 293
(1968). The Court is careful to clarify its position re prior decisions and argues that
Randolph is consistent with them and with the requirements of the sixth amendment.
47 The Randolph opinion was written in three parts by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White. Justice Blackmun concurred in Parts I
and HI but filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and in the judgment. Justice Stewart
fied a dissent which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, while Justice Powell
took no part in the case.
RECENT CASESSummer, 19791
7
Mazak: Parker v. Randolph
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1980
AKRON LAw REvmw
properly follow the instructions provided as an integral part of the trial."
This is the "rule" that provides the basis for our system of jurisprudence.
The Court's decision in Bruton, where the jury was given instructions which
if not followed would have proven devastating to the defendant, is defined
by the Randolph court to be an exception to the rule, one to be followed
in those special situations where the "practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored." 9 If one is convinced that the Court
intended Bruton to be an exception, it follows that the decision in Randolph
is but another application of the general rule to those cases where the evi-
dence against a defendant is considered sufficient apart from the hearsay
testimony which the jury is instructed to disregard.
Such instances include, of course, those times where the defendant
also has made voluntary inculpatory statements that stand unchallenged
before the jury. "We therefore hold that the admission of interlocking con-
fessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." 0
It is not made clear what other circumstances, if any, would warrant
a similar conclusion.
The dissenting opinion in Randolph1 views the decision from the
opposite pole: that Bruton is the general rule to be followed and that the
Randolph case offers nothing more than a vaguely defined exception to it.
Even the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun52 makes a strong argument
against the lack of specificity in the phrase "interlocking confessions" and
that future courts will have to grapple with that ill-defined test. The dis-
senters are also concerned with the distinction between "no error" and
"harmless error." Referring to the lower court decisions that Bruton error in
Randolph was not harmless,5" the minority is reluctant to challenge that
result. Their strong view of the vital importance of the sixth amendment
rights of defendants, coupled with their assessment of the capability of
juries, compels that they find some error. This approach would always
deny the government the opportunity to introduce into evidence in a joint
trial the confessions of one non-testifying defendant if that confession could
be construed by a jury so as to implicate others. The alternative of separate
trials would be required.
Notwithstanding, the convictions of Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton
48 99 S. Ct. at 2137 n.7.
49 Id., quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 135.
50 99 S. Ct. at 2140. For application of sixth amendment rights to the states, see Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
5' 99 S. Ct. at 2143.
5 2 Id. at 2141.
53 Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d at 1183.
[Vol. 13:1
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as decided initially by the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee
stand affirmed. Whether or not the Court succeeded in its objective of
settling Bruton error disputes in the circuit courts is unclear. Delli Paoli and
Bruton were each sound law for eleven years. The question now is to judge
the strength and extent of the Randolph decision.
There is one thing patently clear in the Randolph decision: it neither
repudiated Bruton nor reinstituted Delli Paoli. The Court, in apparently
trying to accommodate differing views on the extent of the rights guaranteed
by the sixth amendment, the application of the rules on hearsay evidence,
and the reliability of juries in following the instructions of the court, may
have only stirred rather than clarified some rather murky waters. While
clearly saying that a defendant who has himself confessed cannot cry error
merely because the court's instructions to disregard the possible inculpating
elements in the confession of a non-testifying codefendant may be wholly
or partially ignored by the jury, it is just as clearly denying the government
an unfettered opportunity to place prejudicial hearsay evidence before a
jury without the possibility of committing reversible error.
No one is challenging the constitutional right of a defendant not to
take the witness stand if that decision appears to further his interests. And
there is no effort to deny the government the right to use an extrajudicial
confession against the defendant, provided that it was properly obtained. The
use of detailed editing together with proper instructions to the jury mitigates
the possible impact on fellow defendants; but these actions cannot be
relied upon to totally wipe improper inferences from the juror's mind.
But erasure is not required. The jury is only asked to give no weight to that
testimony when evaluating the guilt or innocence of other defendants.
Similar demands on jurors are made throughout the course of the trial
and are not very often challenged.5" Confidence that the jury will follow
all instructions is fundamental to our system, and is, at least, the con-
stitutional equal of the right of confrontation.
The Randolph decision does not ignore the sixth amendment but
merely reflects a full consideration of all circumstances of the case. The
ruling appears to be a purposeful attempt to deny a claim of error in all
cases involving interlocking confessions, yet allowing such error when the
second defendant has not provided corrobating testimony. Thus, the impact
is not so much a return to Delli Paoli as a signal that substantial admissions
by a defendant cannot and will not be negated by a "legal nicety."5
A defendant's trial strategy in a joint trial in which the confession
of a non-testifying codefendant is admitted could be to see the trial
54 In civil cases, judgment N.O.V. might be considered a challenge to the jury's ability to
follow instructions.
55 Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1971).
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to a conclusion while retaining the right to claim Bruton error, if circum-
stances permitted, and then move for a separate trial. In the great number of
cases cited as authority in Randolph (including Bruton) no motions for
separate trials were ever made, thus avoiding use of a direct remedy for
abuse of sixth amendment rights. Of course, prior to Bruton the courts had
largely held that the expected admission of a codefendant's confession was
not sufficient grounds for sustaining a motion for severance." One would
expect the impact of Randolph to result in an increase in the granting of such
motions, particularly where the court believes the jury may have unusual
difficulty in segregating evidence against defendants in an organized, cogent
manner. In the future both defendants and judges may invoke Criminal
Rule 14 more freely where the right to confront is in question.
The majority opinion in Randolph can be viewed as a pragmatic solu-
tion to some overlapping and divergent rights of defendants in joint, criminal
trials. On the surface, the Court is warning that while confession may be good
for the defendant's soul, it remains "probably the most probative and dam-
aging evidence that can be admitted against him... ."I" and thus, cannot
be excluded by claiming a mere technical denial of constitutional rights. On
the other hand, there is a limit to the circumstances in which the admission
into evidence of a confession by a non-testifying defendant that tends to
incriminate another defendant will be deemed harmless by the Court.
It is not obvious what limit the Court has in mind. The legal testing
of the Randolph decision should thus not be long in coming. The immediate
result, however, is additional responsibility on the trial judge to determine
whether to instruct the jury to disregard certain testimony or to sever and
institute separate trials.
EDWARD P. MAZAK
56 Note, supra note 37, at 128-29.
57 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 139.
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